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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
 
NORTH AMERICAN STEEL CONNECTION , INC., 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WATSON METAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION; 
GARY OSTERMUELLER 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-4247) 
District Judge:  Hon. Dickinson R. Debevoise 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2013 
 
Before:   SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 18, 2013) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 North American Steel Connection, Inc. (“NASCO”) appeals a September 14, 2010 
order granting summary judgment to defendant Gary Ostermueller and dismissing 
NASCO’s claims against him.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.   
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I. Background 
 NASCO is a Louisiana corporation engaged in the business of importing steel.  In 
August 2007, it formed a joint venture with Watson Metal Products Corporation 
(“Watson”), a New Jersey corporation that manufactured and marketed metal products, 
and a company called Eastgate Global Logistics (“Eastgate”).1
 Soon after the joint venture began, accounting disagreements arose between 
NASCO and Watson.  In addition to disputes regarding the timing of payments and the 
use of WCP’s inventory as collateral for Watson’s credit lines, NASCO discovered that 
Watson had impermissibly intermingled WCP funds with “its own separate corporate 
  The purpose of the joint 
venture, called “Worldwide Construction Products” (“WCP”), was to market and sell 
steel products imported by NASCO from India.  WCP was organized on or around 
August 3, 2007 as a limited liability company (“LLC”) under Delaware law, but no 
formal contract memorializing the terms of the joint venture was executed at that time.  
Rather, the companies established through informal emails and oral conversations that 
Watson, NASCO, and Eastgate would be the members of the LLC, with NASCO 
importing the steel products, Watson providing warehouse space and accounting services, 
and Eastgate managing the primary warehouse.  Watson also continued to operate as an 
independent company, separate from its role in WCP.  At the time the joint venture was 
established, Gary Ostermueller, a New Jersey citizen, was Watson’s president and 
majority shareholder.   
                                              
 1  Eastgate is not a party to this litigation.   
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funds,” and had then used those funds to pay its own corporate debts.  (Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 6.)  Calling the mistake “human error” (App. at 267), Watson fired the 
controller responsible for the intermingling, and, in February 2008, the company entered 
into an agreement with NASCO to repay the money it owed.  Pursuant to that agreement, 
Watson was to pay $496,860 to NASCO in monthly installments of $50,000, with an 
interest rate of 1.2 percent per month.2
 At around the same time, the members of the LLC signed an agreement providing 
that Eastgate and Watson would withdraw from WCP, leaving NASCO as its sole 
member.  After withdrawing, Watson continued to operate a warehouse for NASCO until 
July 2008, when NASCO terminated that arrangement.  During that period, Watson made 
one $50,000 payment to NASCO and earned around $100,000 of credit toward its debt 
through commissions, but, due to increasing financial difficulties, it was unable to pay the 
remainder of the debt.
  Ostermueller signed the agreement on behalf of 
Watson, but he was not a party to it in his personal capacity.   
3
 On August 22, 2008, NASCO filed this action against Watson and Ostermueller, 
stating five claims for relief denominated as breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraudulent misrepresentation and equitable fraud, unjust enrichment, and goods sold and 
delivered.  It seeks $646,339 in damages, which represents the amount Watson allegedly 
   
                                              
 2 $331,362 of the total was from the intermingling of funds; the remainder was 
“based on debts incurred prior to the joint venture.”  (App. at 15.) 
 3 Watson sold all of its assets to a Colorado company on May 9, 2009, and filed 
for bankruptcy on November 22, 2011. 
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still owes pursuant to the February 2008 agreement.  It also requests punitive damages 
and attorney’s fees.   
 NASCO and Ostermueller filed cross motions for summary judgment, with 
NASCO moving for partial summary judgment on Ostermueller’s liability,4 and 
Ostermueller seeking judgment on all of the claims against him.  On September 14, 2010, 
the District Court denied NASCO’s motion and granted Ostermueller’s, concluding that 
there was no evidence to support his being personally liable.  Although the claims against 
Watson are still pending,5
                                              
 4 More specifically, NASCO sought a determination of the amount of damages 
owed, and a further determination that Ostermueller was jointly and severally liable for 
Watson’s debt.   
 the District Court certified as final the order granting summary 
judgment to Ostermueller, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  This 
timely appeal followed.    
 5 Because those claims are still pending, we dismissed NASCO’s first appeal, filed 
on October 6, 2010, due to the absence of a final judgment.  Once Watson entered 
bankruptcy proceedings, the case before the District Court was stayed, and both parties 
requested that the Court certify its judgment as final with respect to the claims against 
Ostermueller so that the issue of his personal liability could be resolved more promptly.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (permitting the district court to enter a final judgment as to one 
party in an action involving multiple parties if that court “determines that there is no just 
reason for delay”); see also Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that an order under Rule 54(b) “may be final and immediately appealable … 
when the district court makes an express determination that there is no just cause for 
delay and expressly directs entry of final judgment”). 
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II. Discussion6
 NASCO offers three theories of how Ostermueller can be held personally liable 
for the damages it incurred through the failed joint venture.  First, it argues that 
circumstances justify piercing Watson’s corporate veil and holding Ostermueller 
individually liable for all the corporation’s debts and liabilities.  Second, it claims that 
Ostermueller is liable under a “participation theory” of liability because he was a 
corporate officer sufficiently involved in the corporation’s commission of a tort.  Third, it 
asserts that Ostermueller was the “manager” of the LLC, and that he is therefore directly 
liable for breaching fiduciary duties he owed to NASCO.
 
7
                                              
 6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the matter is between citizens of different 
states.  As described above, see supra note 5, the District Court entered a final judgment 
with respect to the claims against Ostermueller, as is permitted by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), and so we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Carter, 181 F.3d 
at 343.  “We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.” Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, L.L.C., 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012). 
“Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied ‘that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  Although the moving party bears the burden of showing that 
no genuine issue of fact exists, when that party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, 
it may discharge its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the 
non-moving party’s case.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.     
  We address each of those 
arguments in turn. 
 7 NASCO does not argue that Ostermueller is directly liable for breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment, or goods sold and delivered, instead basing those claims against 
Ostermueller solely on its piercing of the corporate veil theory.  To the extent that 
NASCO seeks to hold Ostermueller directly liable for his commission of “equitable 
fraud” (see Appellant’s Opening Br. at 15-16 (“[O]f crucial importance to Ostermueller’s 
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 A. Piercing of the Corporate Veil 
 New Jersey law8
                                                                                                                                                  
individual liability” is that his involvement in the intermingling of Watson’s and WCP’s 
funds is “sufficient to constitute equitable fraud on his part”), that claim fails because 
NASCO does not seek any equitable remedies.  See Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. 
Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981) (allowing plaintiff to meet the “lesser burden” of 
equitable fraud because it sought “only equitable remedies”); see also Foont-Freedenfeld 
Corp. v. Electro-Protective Corp., 314 A.2d 69, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) 
(“[I]n an action in which plaintiff relies upon equitable fraud, the only relief that may be 
sought is equitable relief, such as rescission or reformation of an agreement, and not 
monetary damages only.”).      
 adheres to “the fundamental propositions that a corporation is a 
separate entity from its shareholders, and that a primary reason for incorporation is the 
insulation of shareholders from the liabilities of the corporate enterprise.”  Richard A. 
Pulaski Const. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 950 A.2d 868, 877 (N.J. 2008) (quoting 
State Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In order for a court to “pierce the corporate veil” and hold a 
shareholder personally liable for a corporation’s liabilities, two conditions must be met: 
first, “there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer exist,” and second, “adherence to the fiction 
 8  Both parties seem to agree that New Jersey law governs their dispute, as that is 
the only law they cite to in their briefing.  That approach comports with New Jersey 
choice-of-law principles, which instruct courts to apply the law of the state that has the 
“most significant relationship” to the occurrence giving rise to the dispute.  Fu v. Fu, 733 
A.2d 1133, 1138 (N.J. 1999) (applying the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
approach to choice-of-law questions); see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that in diversity cases, federal courts must apply the forum 
state’s choice-of-law rules).  Here, Watson’s principal place of business is New Jersey 
and Ostermueller is a New Jersey resident, and so presumably their alleged contract 
violations and tortious conduct occurred in that state, and that state’s law should apply.   
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of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”9
                                              
 9  NASCO tries to focus our attention solely on the second prong of that two-part 
test, arguing that a finding of “equitable fraud” is sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 11.)  As the District Court correctly noted, however, that 
contention is based on a single line, taken out of context, in Walensky v. Jonathan Royce 
International, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), which reads, “in 
a court of equity, all that is required to justify the piercing of a corporate veil is ‘equitable 
fraud.’”  When read in light of the rest of the opinion, that statement seems to suggest 
that equitable fraud, as opposed to legal fraud, can satisfy the second prong of the test, 
not that the first prong can be disregarded whenever there is an allegation of equitable 
fraud.  See Walensky, 624 A.2d at 617 (recognizing at the outset of the analysis that the 
shareholder “was using [the corporation] as his ‘alter ego’ and thus, was abusing the 
corporate form in order to advance his own personal interests”).  Moreover, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court is the final authority on the state’s substantive law, see Craig v. 
Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A federal court sitting 
in diversity must apply the state substantive law as pronounced by the state’s highest 
court … .”), and it has clearly and repeatedly required a finding of “corporate 
dominance” by a parent corporation or other dominant shareholder, prior to piercing the 
corporate veil, id. at 150 (concluding that New Jersey Supreme Court precedent “makes 
clear that piercing the corporate veil depends on a finding of dominance” and “[o]nly 
after there has been such a finding does one reach the fraud or injustice issue” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Richard A. Pulaski Const. Co., 950 A.2d at 877-78; 
Ventron, 468 A.2d at 164.  NASCO’s claim that we need not engage in the “corporate 
dominance” or “alter ego” analysis is therefore without merit.  Equally unavailing is 
NASCO’s argument that the corporate veil should be pierced because, due to Watson’s 
bankrupt status, NASCO will otherwise be deprived of a remedy.  There is no authority 
suggesting that we can disregard New Jersey’s requirements for piercing the corporate 
veil whenever a plaintiff might otherwise be unable to recover for an alleged wrong.   
  State 
Capital Title & Abstract Co. v. Pappas Bus. Servs., 646 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (D.N.J. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other words, the corporation must be the 
“alter ego” of the shareholder, such that the corporate form is effectively a legal fiction, 
and enforcing that legal fiction must result in some fundamental unfairness.  Verni ex rel. 
Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 903 A.2d 475, 497-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006).  The party seeking to pierce the veil bears the burden of proving that those 
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circumstances are present, Richard A. Pulaski Const. Co., 950 A.2d at 877-78, a burden 
that “is notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to meet,” Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 
247 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 In Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., we discussed at length the factors New 
Jersey courts use to determine whether corporate separateness is effectively a “legal 
fiction.”  843 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1988).  Emphasizing that simply being a majority 
stockholder or having “the potential to exercise control” is insufficient, we concluded that 
satisfying the first prong of the veil-piercing analysis requires “complete domination, not 
only of finances but of policy and business practice,” such that the corporate entity has 
“no separate mind, will or existence of its own.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Factors demonstrating that level of dominance include: 
gross undercapitalization … failure to observe corporate 
formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insolvency of the 
debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of funds of the 
corporation by the dominant stockholder, non-functioning of 
other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and 
the fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the 
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  As those factors indicate, the veil-piercing inquiry 
is focused not simply on an individual shareholder’s level of personal involvement with a 
corporation, but rather on whether the corporate form itself is a sham.  Cf. Pappas, 646 F. 
Supp. 2d at 680 (explaining that in a closely held corporation “one member must 
dominate the corporate entity if the business is to function and be profitable,” but that fact 
does not mean the corporation is “a sham corporate entity set up to … evade personal 
liability”).           
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 NASCO points to only one piece of evidence that it argues indicates that 
Ostermueller and Watson lacked “separate personalities” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 
17): a personal loan that Ostermueller obtained to help satisfy Watson’s corporate debt.10
                                              
 10 NASCO referenced two more items in its argument before the District Court: 
Ostermueller’s request “to pledge joint venture inventory as collateral for a Watson line 
of credit” and his “use[] [of] personal pronouns” when referring to his role in the joint 
venture.  (App. at 22.)  It does not mention that evidence in its argument on appeal, 
however, and thus has waived any claim that those facts demonstrate corporate 
dominance.  See United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (“An 
issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief … .”).  In any event, the 
District Court correctly concluded that that evidence “is not enough to show that 
[Ostermueller] was using Watson as his alter ego.”  (App. at 23.)   
    
According to NASCO, “Ostermueller’s willingness to combine personal and corporate 
assets [is] an indication that he saw no difference between the two,” and such an 
inference could support a jury finding that his and Watson’s separate identities had 
“blurr[ed].”   (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17-18.)  As the case law makes clear, however, 
even if we were to agree that Ostermueller’s personal loan constituted a “blurring” of his 
and Watson’s identities (id. at 17), that fact is insufficient to justify piercing the corporate 
veil;  rather, Ostermueller must have dominated Watson to such a degree that the 
corporation had “no separate mind, will or existence of its own.”  Craig, 843 F.2d at 150.  
NASCO has not provided any evidence of such dominance.  It does not allege that 
Watson failed to observe the corporate formalities, much less that Ostermueller was using 
the corporation as a façade for his personal operations.  See id. (identifying those factors 
as indications of corporate dominance).  In fact, taking out a personal loan for the benefit 
of the corporation is the opposite of “siphoning of funds of the corporation by the 
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dominant stockholder,” which is the type of evidence typically used to justify 
disregarding the corporate form.  Id.   
 Because there is no evidence that Watson’s corporate form was a sham, no 
reasonable jury could find a basis for piercing the corporate veil,11 and the District Court 
was correct to resolve that claim as a matter of law.12
 B. Participation Theory of Liability 
  
 NASCO next argues that even if the corporate veil between Watson and 
Ostermueller cannot be pierced, Ostermueller is directly liable to NASCO based on a 
“participation theory” of liability.  Under that theory, “a corporate officer can be held 
personally liable for a tort committed by the corporation when he or she is sufficiently 
involved in the commission of the tort.”  Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 788 A.2d 268, 
272 (N.J. 2002).  There are three distinct elements that a plaintiff must establish to 
succeed under the participation theory: (1) “the corporation owed a duty of care to the 
victim”; (2) that duty “was delegated to the officer”; and (3) “the officer breached the 
                                              
 11 NASCO’s emphasis on “the heightened fiduciary duties that exist between 
parties to a joint venture” is irrelevant to the veil-piercing analysis.  (Appellant’s Opening 
Br. at 1.)  The duties that Watson and Ostermueller may have owed to NASCO are 
unrelated to whether Watson was Ostermueller’s “alter ego,” and thus they cannot serve 
as a basis to pierce the corporate veil.  See Verni, 903 A.2d at 498 (describing the “alter 
ego” doctrine).  As the District Court accurately explained, “NASCO cannot use the joint 
venture theory as an end-run around the burdens imposed on a party seeking to disregard 
the corporate form.”  (App. at 27.) 
 12  Because we conclude that there is no evidence supporting a finding of corporate 
dominance, we do not reach the second prong of the analysis – whether failing to pierce 
the veil would result in fraud or injustice.  Ventron, 468 A.2d at 164; see also Craig, 843 
F.2d at 150 (“Only after there has been [a finding of corporate dominance] does one 
reach the fraud or injustice issue.”).            
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duty of care by his own conduct.”  Id.  NASCO claims that Ostermueller is directly 
responsible for Watson’s intermingling of the funds of the joint venture, and thus, as 
Watson’s corporate officer, could be found liable under the participation theory.   
 NASCO’s argument fails because it has not alleged any actual culpability on the 
part of Ostermueller in the intermingling of funds.  Even if the intermingling were 
tortious (a point on which we express no opinion), Ostermueller’s only involvement with 
it was that his responsibilities as president of Watson allegedly included “mak[ing] sure 
that [the controller] keeps proper track of money.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21.)  
NASCO does not provide any evidence that Ostermueller directed the intermingling, that 
he condoned it, or that he negligently supervised the controller.  Rather, NASCO claims 
that Ostermueller’s status as a supervisor is itself sufficient to establish his participation 
in a corporate tort, effectively arguing that corporate officers are personally liable for all 
torts that occur on their watch.  That argument ignores the element of the participation 
theory requiring that the corporation’s breach occurred “by [the officer’s] own conduct,” 
Saltiel, 788 A.2d at 272, and it is plainly contradicted by the principle of New Jersey law 
that “[a] director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts 
merely by reason of his official character,” Sensale v. Applikon Dyeing & Printing Corp., 
79 A.2d 316, 317-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951).  Therefore, no reasonable jury 
could find that Ostermueller was “sufficiently involved” in the intermingling of funds to 
be held personally liable for it, Saltiel, 788 A.2d at 272, and the District Court properly 
rejected that claim.          
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 C. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
 Finally, NASCO argues that Ostermueller breached his fiduciary duties to 
NASCO, and should, one way or another,13
 As the District Court rightly observed, that argument fails because there is no 
evidence that Ostermueller was in fact the manager of WCP.  The manager of an LLC is 
not simply a person who assumes management responsibilities.  Rather, under Delaware 
law, the “manager” must have been “named as a manager … in a limited liability 
company agreement or similar instrument under which the limited liability company is 
formed.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(10).
 be held personally liable for that breach.  
Specifically, NASCO maintains that Ostermueller was the “manager” of WCP 
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3), and that he thus owed the participants in the joint venture 
a “heightened” fiduciary duty (id. at 1), which he breached by allowing the intermingling 
of the LLC’s funds with Watson’s.   
14
                                              
 13 NASCO’s argument on this point is rather unclear.  Its primary claim seems to 
be that Ostermueller’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties is itself a basis for piercing 
Watson’s corporate veil, which, as we have explained, ignores New Jersey’s 
requirements for veil-piercing, see supra note 11.  NASCO also asserts more generally 
that Ostermueller should be directly liable for the breach of a duty it says that he owed to 
NASCO as “manager” of the joint venture.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1-2, 20.)  The 
latter argument is the one we address here.     
  Once so designated, the manager “has 
the authority to bind the limited liability company,” id. § 18-402, and thus owes 
“traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the members of the LLC, unless the 
 14 Although New Jersey law governs NASCO’s claims generally, see supra note 8, 
Delaware law governs the internal affairs of a Delaware entity.  Cf. Fagin v. Gilmartin, 
432 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules, the law of 
the state of incorporation governs internal corporate affairs.”).      
13 
 
parties expressly modify or eliminate those duties in the operating agreement,” William 
Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 756 (Del. 2011).   
 NASCO points to only two instances in which Ostermueller was referred to as the 
“manager” of WCP: an email in which he offered to “resign as manager,” and a reference 
in his affidavit to being the “manager.”15
                                              
 15 NASCO’s focus on a clause from the withdrawal agreement is misplaced.  The 
clause reads:  
  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 5; see also App. at 
299, 346.)  Under Delaware law, Ostermueller could not have unilaterally established 
himself as manager of the LLC through such statements.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-
101(10) (defining a manager as a person so designated in an LLC agreement).  NASCO 
has presented no evidence that the members of the LLC agreed that he would occupy that 
position, or that he in fact exercised management authority.  Because of that lack of 
evidence, no reasonable jury could find that he was in a fiduciary relationship with 
NASCO, much less that he is liable for breach of a fiduciary duty.  See Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. 2006) (“[A] fiduciary relationship is a 
Effective January 1, 2008, Gary E. Ostermueller, President of 
Watson, on behalf of Watson, resigns as the Managing 
Member of [WCP] and Watson withdraws as a Member of 
[WCP].    
(App. at 343; see also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 5.)  To the extent that that passage is 
ambiguous as to whether Ostermueller or Watson was the “managing member,” that 
ambiguity is clarified by the preceding clauses in the contract, which explain that 
Watson, Eastgate, and NASCO are the founding members of the LLC, and that Waston 
and Eastgate are withdrawing, leaving NASCO as the sole remaining member.  
Moreover, NASCO does not claim that Ostermueller was a member of the LLC, which 
would be required in order for him to have been the managing member.  Although the 
manager of an LLC need not be a member, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-402, the cited 
clause says nothing about Ostermueller’s role as manager, and thus is irrelevant to that 
inquiry.   
14 
 
situation where one person reposes special trust in another or where a special duty exists 
on the part of one person to protect the interests of another.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The District Court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to 
Ostermueller on that claim.               
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Ostermueller on all of the claims against him.                          
